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Introduction
The transition from plan to market has been extensively dealt with empirically at the firm level, including the impact of institutions, especially the business climate, and new firms on economywide productivity, output, and employment growth (Fagio and . On the aggregate level, the labor relocation from the less productive state to the more productive private sector was a key issue in the theoretical literature, pioneered by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) , and further developed by Atkinson and Kehoe (1996) and Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997) , Castanheira and Roland (2000) and others. The experience of the past two decades has shown that a successful transition hinges on the dynamic private sector, and especially new firms, to drive the productivity and employment growth. At the same time, the global financial and economic crisis demonstrated usefulness of well-targeted government interventions, including job creation.
This paper develops a theoretical framework that examines the role of institutions, with a focus on the business climate, firm start-ups and exits as well as the observed productivity and employment paths during transition. It also discusses the role of the state sector as an employer when reforming institutions is particularly costly. Specifically, the paper presents a dynamic search model that shows how an enabling institutional set up stimulates start-ups of highly productive private firms, leading to a fast recovery of productivity and increased share of good (highly productive and well-paid) jobs during the transition. The model explains some of the diverging economic outcomes between the Central and Eastern European and Baltic (CEEB) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) economies. The CEEB countries embarked swiftly on economic reforms including the transformation of the institutional infrastructure in general and the business climate in particular. In contrast, the CIS countries were slower in implementing reforms and still have a long way to go to achieve business climate quality that has been already established in the CEEB economies (Mitra, Muravyev and Schafer, 2009 ).
Labor relocation during transition was accompanied by a debate on the role of the state sector in the economy, including as an employer (Roland, 2000; Tichit, 2006) . The issue was viewed as important because the social costs of transition, in particular high and persistent unemployment, could have slowed the transition and possibly bring it to a halt. And in fact, it is the concern about the social cost of adjustment that prevents some countries, such as Belarus, to adopt more decisive market reforms. With declining unemployment and emerging labor shortages in the CEEB countries during the boom of 2000-07, the debate seemed over. The private sector was seen as the best way to achieve growth with employment and social stability, and the selfcorrecting ability of markets was emphasized. However, as the global financial and economic crisis has turned into the global employment crisis, the social consequences have started to top the policy agenda. With that turn, the debate on the appropriate role of the state in the economy, in providing regulatory framework as well as supporting job creation, has been revived. This paper contributes to this debate with insights from transition experiences. It illustrates that in countries where reforms of institutions and the business climate have been particularly costly and prospects for private job creation poor, the role of the state sector as an employer rises.
The theoretical model presented in this paper extends the framework of Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997) , who in turn build on the literature on industry evolution and job creation and destruction of Jovanovich (1983) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the stylized facts on the economic restructuring and sets out the different reform trajectories that the CEEB and CIS countries have experienced so far. Section develops the model of transition with start ups responding to the business climate. Section 4 presents numerical experiments and illustrates the model's implications for productivity, structure of the private sector, and employment during transition. Section 5 conducts policy analysis and shows that the role of the state as an employer rises during the transition if reforms to the institutional set up are sluggish. Section 6 concludes.
Stylized Facts
This section summarizes the main macroeconomic trends that our theoretical model aims to capture, namely private sector growth, employment, unemployment, output, and labor productivity. It also briefly discusses policies and institutions, which contributed to these trends. The CEED economies are compared with non-oil exporting countries of the CIS 3 .
Similar starting conditions, divergent paths
At the outset of the transition, the CEEB and non-oil CIS countries exhibited similar structural conditions as they all started from central planning and were dominated by corporate and financial structures shaped by the socialist system. In 1990, these countries had a low share of the private sector in GDP, lacked competition policy and a well functioning two-tiers banking system. The institutional set up and the business climate in particular were characterized by rigidities and excessive regulations. The composition of production was skewed towards industry and agriculture, whilst services occupied a limited role in GDP compared to other countries at a similar level of development ( Figure 1 ). Source: Authors' calculations based on data drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and EBRD transition indicators. Note: The EBRD indicators increase from 1 (little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy) to 4 or more (standards of an industrialized market economy).
-4 -From a macroeconomic point of view, the CEEB and non-oil CIS countries started transition with enforced full employment, limited foreign trade and artificially low inflation rates. The liberalization of prices and foreign trade (the so-called type 1 reforms) in the early 1990s resulted in very high inflation rates and unsustainable current account deficits. Therefore, policy makers initially focused on establishing macroeconomic stability. The CEEB countries managed to bring inflation rates to low 2-digit territories by the mid-1990s, while the stabilization took longer in non-oil CIS countries (Svejnar, 2001; EBRD, 2005) .
The CEEB and the non-oil CIS countries differed in the speed and scope with which "type-2 structural reforms" were put in place. "Type 2" reforms consisted mainly of measures key for establishing conditions for private sector development and growth: corporate restructuring, a well functioning competition authority, administrative reforms, development of a commercial banking sector and effective tax system, infrastructure, labor market regulations, and establishment and enforcement of a market-oriented legal system and accompanying institutions. 4 CEEB countries adopted these structural measures faster and also paid a much greater attention to the quality of the framework (Figure 2a) . 5 As a result, the business climate has become more competitive in the CEEB than in the CIS countries, as also evidenced by mark-up indexes (Figure 2b ).
More generally, the CEE-5 and in particular the Baltic countries were placed well above the nonoil CIS countries in various rankings of competitiveness and the quality of the business climates. -5 - As Aidis (2003) states, "…productive entrepreneurship cannot be taken for granted in transition countries, and is influenced both by the current institutional weakness, as well as by historical legacies." Regarding institutions, EBRD (2008) showed a link between product market competition and growth; higher competition (approximated by lower mark-ups) is associated with higher firm entry and productivity. Bastos and Nasir (2004) found that the competitive pressure is the most critical factor of the investment climate for firm-level productivity.
Private sector growth
Successful transition from plan to market has depended critically on the emergence of a dynamic private sector. In the first stage, privatization and restructuring of public enterprises was mostly associated with short-term job destruction and slow growth in productivity and output. Over time, privatized firms have contributed to job creation and growth by using resources more efficiently. With substantial lowering of entry barriers, the de novo private small and medium enterprises tend to drive the recovery of output, employment, and labor productivity 7 . Aslund and Johnson (2004) emphasized that even small differences in policies towards small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can have a strong impact on private sector growth in transition economies. 8 In that context, the early 1990s reforms of the economic and legal environments and the straightforward and transparent rules for firm creation in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to acceleration in the number of SMEs (Smallbone and Venessar, 2004) . Figure 3 indicates that a higher number of SMEs per capita is associated with higher private sector output.
Structural transformations
As many new private firms were created in the service sector and to a lesser degree in manufacturing, rapid private sector growth was accompanied by a sectoral shift. A sectoral shift -6 -occurred as a correction of imbalances inherited from central planning, where the service sector in all countries was underdeveloped in comparison to countries with similar income levels. Specifically, in 1990, industry took a disproportionately large share of output and employment in all countries, and agriculture played an important role in the Baltic and CIS countries. Transition everywhere has been characterized by labor reallocation from industry and agriculture towards services, especially in the early 1990s 9 . The shift towards services and away from agriculture was more marked in the CEEB as compared to the CIS countries (Figure 4) . The decrease in the share of industry and manufacturing in GDP is very similar across the three country groups (Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and non-oil CIS). In 2006, industry -7 -accounted for about 30% and manufacturing for 20% of GDP in all three groups. Yet, the composition of manufacturing products changed markedly in Central and Eastern Europe, while it remained mostly unchanged in the CIS. Composition of production shifted towards highertechnology products in Central and Eastern Europe and to a lesser degree in the Baltics, but the average high-technology content of CIS exports declined between 1996 and 2006 ( Figure 5 ). In summary, also within the group of SMEs, the share of "high productivity" enterprises has been increasing more rapidly in CEEB countries than in the non-oil CIS countries. 
Productivity paths
The transition outcomes reflect broadly the diverging reform paths. The transitional recession of the early 1990s was shorter in the CEEB, with their real GDP picking up much earlier than in the non-oil CIS group ( Figure 6 ). For instance, real economic activities reached their 1990 levels already in 1997 in the CEE-5, while the non-oil CIS countries still remained below their 1990 levels even in 2007. A similar pattern has emerged for economy-wide productivity developments. -8 -
The Model

Environment
The model below shows how the quality of institutions, including the business climate, affects the entrepreneurs' choice of the type of firm (or technology) they operate and consequently the output, employment, and productivity during transition and in the steady state. The single consumption good can be produced by one of the three technologies:
, where s z is the technology in the state sector, and h z and l z are the highproductivity and low-productivity technologies in the private sector. 11 They also differ in units of labor required per unit of output. The profitability of each business opportunity depends upon both its productivity (high or low). The business opportunity that the entrepreneur receives is of high productivity, h z , with probability φ and of low productivity, l z , with φ − 1 . In addition to search effort, each entrepreneur also chooses whether to take the opportunity that arrives or to search for a more profitable one. In each period, the business opportunity allows entrepreneurs to produce output it y using it n amount of labor according to 
where p is probability that the searching entrepreneurs accept low productive business opportunities. Moreover,
, that is no entrepreneurs run businesses in period 0.
The total labor in the private sector, ) 15 Equations (5) and (6) state that the return from operating a private firm consists of profits plus the change of the value of running a firm over time. According to (7), the return from searching for a business opportunity equals the net expected return from running a business plus the change of the value of searching.
Solution
The entrepreneur chooses the search intensity, x, and accepts the low productivity business opportunity with probability p p = so that the marginal cost of search equals to the expected marginal payoff. Denoting 
where for a given level of business environment θ -11 -The dynamic competitive equilibrium is characterized by the path of ) , , ( m p L satisfying (8) and (9). Equation (9) and its components shows that for given state sector employment and the private firms, the private sector grows more rapidly in an enabling business environment.
Characterizing transition with the phase diagram
Before turning to simulation results, the phase diagram below illustrates in further detail the impact of business environment on the speed of the private sector development for the special case of the immediate state sector closure and constant business environment. The impact of business environment on both transition and steady state can be seen directly from (9), where the comparative statics is as follows: ) , , , , (
. With improvement of the business environment, i.e. with lower θ , both the size of the private sector in the steady state and the rate of the private sector creation increase.
Transition paths of m and L for this case are depicted in Figure 7 . The saddle path is the locus along which L is constant at its steady-state value. While the control variable L jumps immediately to its steady state value, the state variable, m, gradually converges to the steady state according to (9). 16 As L increases with the improvement of the business environment, so does the search of entrepreneurs and the rate of firm creation, as well as its steady state value. Figure 7 shows a phase diagram of the transition economy for the case in which the entrepreneurs take all the business opportunities they find during the entire transition, as long as the institutions/business climate is characterized by 1 θ (and hence leads to the equilibrium search In the steady state, if the after-tax productivity gap between high and low productive businesses is relatively large, the entrepreneurs run only highly productive businesses, i.e. p=0. If the gap is small, they run both types of businesses, i.e. p=1. Under the immediate state sector closure the number of searching entrepreneurs, u m , shrinks as quickly as the number of entrepreneurs running firms, m, expands. 17 The productivity transition path thus depends partly on the timing of entrepreneurs' choice of the type of firm to operate (technology). In this respect, the model is somewhat related to Parente and Prescott (2000).
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Numerical Experiments
This section presents results of the model that are broadly consistent with developments in transition economies over the past 20 years. In particular, the model simulations illustrate the impact of business environment on the firm start-ups, unemployment and labor productivity. The time period is one year. Other baseline parameters are chosen to broadly reflect some aspects of the annual observations from the transition countries', EBRD and OECD statistical databases: (2) to open only high productive businesses. Under the above parameters, because the highly productive firms employ more workers, both employment and labor productivity are higher when the business environment is conducive to firm start-ups. Sensitivity analysis with respect to the following key parameter assumptions was carried out: (i) the share of high productive business opportunities, and (ii) productivity level in the high productive firm. Table 3 shows that the main results are robust to different assumptions: 
Transition
Improving the business climate
Simulations below show the impact of the business climate on the labor market outcomes in transition, taking the rate of the state sector closure as given. The case where the poor environment persists ( 8 . 0 = θ ), i.e. the "tax" on the high-productivity firms remains high) is compared with the case where the environment improves, reflecting market reforms (the "tax" rate starts at , where ξ is the rate at which the environment improves. For both cases, the impacts on the size and the structure of the private sector, level of unemployment and its duration as well as on labor productivity are examined. Figure 8a shows that with improvement of institutions and establishing more conducive business climate, during the transition the entrepreneurs shift from opening both high and low productive firms to opening only high productivity ones -this scenario approximates the case of the CEEB countries. The case of the non-oil CIS countries (Figure 8b) shows that when a poor business -14 -environment ( 6 . 0 = θ ) prevails, it induces firms to open both high and low productive firms during the entire transition. Thus substantial share of private firms are smaller and operating in low productive activities. Consequently, the aggregate unemployment can be also higher than under more enabling business environment scenario. Depicting different paths of labor productivity, Figure 8c shows that when the business climate is more enabling, the average labor productivity grows faster and its steady state value is higher than when the environment is rigid. 
Reducing entrepreneurs' search cost
An alternative way to stimulate start ups is through reducing entrepreneurs' search costs/increasing their search efficiency. Such policies include training of entrepreneurs, assisting them with writing business proposals, and more broadly reducing entry barriers by streamlining registration and licensing. Since relative sectoral profits remain unchanged with lower search cost, these policies do not influence sectoral allocation of firms, but result in increased number of both high-productivity and low-productivity firms and reduced unemployment. 19 Similarly to Burda (1993) , the increasing marginal social costs of unemployment prevent the immediate state sector closure to be optimal, as the associated costs would be enormous. This section also assumes that the marginal product of workers in the informal sector is zero, without loss of results' generality.
-17 - Equation (15) states that the shadow value of the additional entrepreneur running a private firm is the discounted value of the difference in productivity between the state and the private sectors, net of the social costs of search. From (16) this value also determines the optimal value of the unemployment. Hence, the optimal size of the state sector employment is such that the unemployment level is also constant along the transition path. Finally, the optimal search effort and unemployment, together with 0 m , then determine the unique optimal path of the number of entrepreneurs running private firms, as described by equation (16).
Together, (14) - (16) show that for a given level of state sector employment and number of entrepreneurs, the optimal rate of growth of the private sector is slower in a weaker business environment. Conversely, the optimal level of the state sector employment is higher the closer the productivity gap between the state and private sectors, the higher the social cost that the policymakers attach to unemployment, and with less enabling business environment.
Simulations of the optimal transition paths for different business environments show that the optimal rate of the state sector closure is slower under more distorted business environment than under a more enabling one (Figure 9 ). This is because with limited private job creation, workers' opportunity costs of remaining employed in the state sector are low. 
Conclusions
This paper examined differences in private sector, productivity and employment growth in the Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic (CEEB) versus the non-oil CIS countries, using a model of labor reallocation and firm creation with transaction costs. The CEEB's faster implementation of market reforms and a more enabling institutional set up and business climate stimulated an earlier structural shift towards more productive private firms. This also led to more rapid employment and labor productivity growth, and, consequently, to faster convergence to the income levels of more advanced economies.
All transition countries would benefit from reducing further the remaining obstacles to private sector activities, such as credit constraints, high payroll taxes, and in the new EU members also the persistent skill shortages. The global financial crisis and tightened credit conditions have underscored the importance of improving the efficiency of financial markets, and especially access of small and medium enterprises to credit.
Rational policy makers will and have paced the reduction of public sector employment in line with improvements of the business climate and realistic possibilities of creating private sector jobs, as shown in our analysis. Where such improvements are slow and costly (as, for example, in Belarus due to the political constraints), it is rational to keep workers in public jobs for longer, rather than pursuing radical closure of public enterprises. This said, the resulting slower paths of labor productivity and output growth are inferior to outcomes in an environment with early and vigorous improvements of the business climate. This confirms the importance of undertaking structural reforms and strengthening the business climate early on. These lessons of transition can be applied to other regions and countries where the business climate is still weak and the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment.
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ANNEX I. Country examples -Contrasting experiences of Estonia and Belarus
The sections below elaborate on the stylized facts by illustrating the particularly contrasting strategies to market reforms and outcomes in Estonia and Belarus.
Estonia established very swiftly liberal trade regime and business environment after regaining independence in the early 1990s. For some time now, the country has been considered to have one of the most open and competitive economies in the world (OECD, 2009). To some extent, the enabling business environment reflected close proximity to the EU markets and strong incentives of the EU accession that country benefited from. 20 As Gylfason and Hochreiter (2009) write, for Estonia "…the prospect of rapid EU integration, the EU perspective, provided a critical anchor for sustained political, institutional, and economic reforms across the political spectrum."
In contrast, with its gradual and often inconsistent approach, Belarus has been lagging behind all other transition economies, perhaps with the exception of Turkmenistan, in terms of the speed of adopting market reforms. In fact, Belarus' business environment is considered to be one of the harshest in the world, with frequent changes of the rules increasing uncertainty surrounding entrepreneurial operations (Smallbone, Slonimski and Pobol, 2008) . At the same time, the country has put a great emphasis on maintaining high employment and social stability.
Regarding specific outcomes, Estonia's friendly business environment has led to high rates of firm creation and the rapid private sector take-off (Figure 1, AI) , even relative to other new EU member countries undergoing similar transition such as the Czech Republic (Jurajda and Terell, 2008) . In fact, the private sector has dominated the economy since mid-1990s; specifically it reached 70 percent of output by 1996 (EBRD, 2005). In Belarus, however, the private sector is in early stages of development, accounting for only about 30 percent of GDP.
21
While relatively high unemployment rate accompanied a substantial part of the Estonia's transition to the market, the official unemployment rate in Belarus has remained in very low single digits. Specifically, in 2007 the share of the private sector in employment amounted to 76 percent in Estonia. While the 2007 figure is not available for Belarus, the private sector accounted for only about 20 percent of total employment in 1999 way below of 70 percent share in Estonia at that time (EBRD, 2008). However, Belarus' seemingly good labor market performance reflected in low unemployment has been, largely, due to postponed reforms (Brixiova and Volchok, 2005) . 22 Moreover, the average labor productivity grew more rapidly in Estonia than in Belarus (Figure 2, AI) . 23 The productivity gap can be partly explained by markedly higher share of employment in services in Estonia than in Belarus, while Belarus is characterized by a relatively high share of employment in agriculture. 20 Wanchek (2009) found that international trade played a significant role in the emergence of institutions, as the high search cost for foreign buyers reduce the potential to export value-added, or complex, products. 21 In practice, this number includes large and medium-sized joint stock enterprises with majority of state ownership, so the actual share of the private sector in output may be even lower. Nevertheless, even in the difficult conditions, some innovative, knowledge-based private firms emerged (Smallbone at el., 2008). 22 A high share of the working age population outside of the labor force in Belarus is another factor. 23 The result is derived even with the official GDP data, which have likely overstated the actual output in Belarus due to source data that may have introduced an upward bias into the measured GDP (IMF, 2005).
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